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Prior work on insider threat classification has adopted a range of definitions, constructs, and 
terminology, making it challenging to compare studies. We address this issue by introducing a unified 
insider threat classification model built through a comprehensive and systematic review of prior work. 
An insider threat can be challenging to predict, as insiders may utilise motivation, creativity, and 
ingenuity.  Understanding the different types of threats to information security (and cybersecurity) is 
crucial as it helps organisations develop the right preventive strategies. This paper presents a thematic 
analysis of the literature on the types of insider threats to cybersecurity to provide cohesive definitions 
and consistent terminology of insider threats. We demonstrate that the insider threat exists on a 
continuum of accidental, negligent, mischievous, and malicious behaviour. The proposed insider 
threat classification can help organisations to identify, implement, and contribute towards improving 
their cybersecurity strategies. 
 
Keywords Cybersecurity, Information security, Human Factors, Insider threats. 
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1 Introduction  
The introduction of new technologies, network-enabled devices, and increased connectivity has 
enabled organisations to be globally connected and improve the way they do business. While the 
growing integration of outsourcing, offshore work, and remote offices offer many opportunities, it also 
increases the organisation's information systems exposure to cybersecurity threats and risks. These 
threats arise due to dilution of the organisational protection barriers and an increase in the number of 
people who have insider access rights from a remote location (Dupuis & Khadeer, 2016; Sasse et al., 
2007). An insider is an individual who is currently or was formerly employed by the organisation, or a 
collaborator, or a partner, or a contractor, or other associates that have authorized access to the 
organisation's networks, systems, or data (CERT, 2018).  We use this reference definition in our study 
as it refers explicitly to human actors, their relationship with the organisation, and their authorised 
access to the systems at some time. 
Cybersecurity is socio-technical and involves humans and technical systems. Technical systems have 
vulnerabilities, and so do humans (Sasse et al., 2007). Understanding the different types of threats 
humans can pose is essential, as this knowledge can help organisations implement the right strategies 
to protect their information systems. Several researchers have suggested different methods of 
classification for insider threats (refer to Table 1). But the classification methods are incompatible as 
they are based on different factors, making it difficult to integrate existing concepts.   In addition, we 
find inconsistencies in the literature with the classification of non-malicious threats and the 
terminology used. For the field to advance, we need consistent terminology and a unified 
understanding of the threats posed. This study makes several significant contributions to research on 
the role of insiders in cybersecurity. We integrate existing literature to present a unified insider threat 
classification, cohesive terminology, and effective definition for the different types of insider threats. 
We propose an insider threat classification exist on a continuum of accidental, negligent, mischievous, 
and malicious nature. 
In this paper, we review the literature to identify the different types of insiders and perform a thematic 
analysis.  We then define and explain the identified types of insiders. This is followed by a discussion 
on the implications of the proposed classification to theory and practice. The paper concludes by 
considering the contributions made and recommendations for future research. 
2 Related Work 
Insiders play a considerable role in the use and misuse of information systems within an organisation. 
The insider poses a unique security threat, as they may know how to achieve the most significant 
impact to the organisation while leaving little evidence (NAIC, 2008). CERT (2018) (pg. 17) defines an 
insider threat as  
"a current or former employee, contractor, or another business partner who has or had 
authorised access to an organisation's network, system, or data; and has intentionally 
exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, or physical well-being of the organisation's 
information, information systems, or workforce; or who through their action or inaction 
without malicious intent causes harm or substantially increases the probability of severe 
future harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organisation's information, 
or information systems." 
The risk to the organisation from insider threats can include tangible losses such as a decrease in 
service availability and effectiveness; and intangible losses such as loss of intellectual property and 
public damage to the brand (CERT, 2018). According to a report by Ponemon (2020), the overall 
number of insider incidents has spiked by 47% globally in the last two years, and the average cost of 
insider threats to an organisation has risen by 31% in that period to $11.45 million. 
While the focus for insider threat is generally on the motive or intentional action of the breach 
(Hadlington, 2018), harm can also be caused by individuals without any malicious intent (Carroll, 
Greitzer, & Roberts, 2014). Indeed, while initially omitted as a category, the Computer Emergency and 
Recovery Team (CERT) have introduced unintentional insider as a threat category only since 2016 
(CERT, 2016). CERT (2018) and Verizon (2018) classify insider threats as unintentional (those that 
perform actions without any malicious intent), and malicious (those that intentionally use or exceed 
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their privileges in a manner that negatively affects the organisation). Their classification is limited to 
these two categories, and the term unintentional includes all non-malicious acts. 
One of the dominant themes used for the threat classification is the intention, which is described using 
terms such as accidental, intentional, or deliberate. Loch, Carr, and Warkentin (1992) classify threats 
as accidental and intentional. Im and Baskerville (2005) elaborate on the above classification and 
include catastrophes and human error as part of accidental threats. Human errors are further 
classified as skill-based such as data input errors, rule-based such as invalid default values, and 
knowledge-based such as software update crash (Im & Baskerville, 2005). A similar but brief 
classification was given by Crossler et al. (2013) for the maladaptive behaviour of insiders as 
intentionally conducted (deviant behaviour), and unintentionally conducted (misbehaviour). Crossler's 
definition of unintentional intent includes misbehaviour caused by the action or inaction of an 
individual and also accidental threats.   
Other studies have combined behavioural intent and malicious intent. Wall (2013) describe insiders as 
a non-malicious negligent insider, non-malicious well-meaning insider, and the malicious insider. 
Kraemer and Carayon (2007) include deliberate violations of non-malicious nature in their 
classification and classify insider threats as accidental, deliberate violations of a non-malicious nature, 
and deliberate violations of a malicious nature. A similar classification is presented by Van Den Bergh 
and Njenga (2016). They classify insider behaviour as misbehaviour (intentional violation without 
knowledge of the violation), non-malicious deviant behaviour (intentional non-malicious violation), 
and malicious deviant behaviour (intentional malicious violations). Though these types are the same as 
those described by Wall (2013), different terms are used to describe the threats. Carroll et al. (2014) 
present a conceptual framework with a focus on not only the behavioural intent and malicious intent, 
but also the individual's action and inaction that could be a threat. They classify insider threats to 
cybersecurity as non-malicious unintentional information compromised due to lack of action, non-
malicious unintentional information compromise due to action, and intentional malicious.  
Interestingly, some studies consider the role of the individual's technical skills in their security 
behaviour. Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005) focus on the user's technical expertise in 
addition to their intentions. The technical expertise needed to perform the act is described as high or 
low; and intentions are described as malicious, neutral, and beneficial.  The insider threats are 
categorised in six categories as (1) intentional destruction (malicious with high technical expertise) 
with a firm intention to harm IS, (2) detrimental misuse (malicious with low expertise) with an 
intention to harm through annoyance, harassment, and rule-breaking, (3) Dangerous tinkering 
(neutral with high expertise) use of skills with no intent to harm, (4) naïve mistakes (neutral with low 
expertise) no intention to harm, (5) aware assurance (beneficial with high expertise) with an intention 
to do good, and (6) basic hygiene (beneficial with low expertise) with an intention to do good without 
technical expertise. In our study, this was among a few classifications that specifically included an 
individual's good intentions resulting in harm to the organisation's IS. 
Some studies outline behaviour and intent as a continuum. Willison and Warkentin (2013) and 
Aurigemma and Mattson (2014) propose the intent of an insider to be a continuum. Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) outline intent as a continuum ranging from passive non-volitional non-compliance 
to volitional non-malicious non-compliance, and intentional malicious acts.  Whereas, Aurigemma and 
Mattson (2014) show non-malicious behaviour as a continuum of volitional to non-volitional. We find 
this type of classification practical as an individual's behaviour is granular and a gradient rather than 
being type-cast. 
3 Thematic Analysis 
Through this review of prior work, we make three observations.  Firstly, we observe that researchers 
have classified insider threats based on many different factors such as intent, motive, technical 
expertise, or combinations of the above. A unified threat classification method is desirable as it will 
enable an organisation to identify potential threats and develop appropriate prevention strategies. The 
mitigation strategy implemented for one type of threat may not be suitable for another.  For example, 
an insider lacking skills to use the system can be provided with user training; however, if a user is 
deliberately misusing the system, then user training is of no use. Therefore, to improve our 
understanding of the insider information security threats, we integrate the different approaches taken 
in prior work and present a new unified method of classifying insider types later in this paper. 
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The second observation made was that different terms had been used to describe the same threat, for 
example, as:  
 a threat caused by accident is described using terms such as accidental (Im & Baskerville, 
2005; Loch et al., 1992), unintentional (CERT, 2018; Elmrabit, Yang, & Yang, 2015; Verizon, 
2018), passive non-volitional non-compliance (Willison & Warkentin, 2013), and 
misbehaviour (Crossler et al., 2013; Van Den Bergh & Njenga, 2016); 
 a threat resulting through inaction to follow the prescribed security procedures is described 
using terms such as negligent (Wall, 2013), naïve mistakes (Stanton et al., 2005), and 
deliberate non-malicious (Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007);  
 a threat resulting from active-risk behaviour, i.e. through the deliberate action of misuse of 
privileges is described using terms such as deliberate tinkering (Stanton et al., 2005), non-
malicious well-meaning (Wall, 2013), and non-malicious deviant (Van Den Bergh & Njenga, 
2016); and 
 a threat caused by malicious intent was consistent in all descriptions as malicious and 
intentional or deliberate. 
Our third observation was the use of inconsistent definitions to describe threats, thereby making it 
impossible to compare studies directly. For example, some researchers describe threats caused by the 
intentional non-malicious violation (such as negligent and mischievous threats as shown in Table 1) as 
being intentional (Guo et al., 2011; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007), while others describe them to be 
unintentional (Carroll et al., 2014; CERT, 2018; Crossler et al., 2013; Verizon, 2018). To advance the 
field, we need a common vocabulary.  
We classify an insider threat to cybersecurity based on intent, motive, and action as (1) accidental: 
unintentional, non-malicious, (2) negligent: intentional, non-malicious, due to inaction, (3) 
mischievous: intentional, non-malicious, due to actions through misuse of privileges, and (4) 
malicious: intentional, malicious. Table 1 summarises the thematic analysis of insider threats. 
 
Author(s) Accidental Negligent Mischievous Malicious 
Loch et al. (1992) Accidental   Intentional 
Stanton et al. (2005) Basic Hygiene & 
Aware Assurance 







Kraemer and Carayon 
(2007) 
Accidental Deliberate      
Non-malicious 































Carroll et al. (2014)  Non-malicious 
Unintentional 
compromise due 











 Malicious Deviant 
CERT (2018) 
Verizon (2018) 
Unintentional Unintentional Unintentional Malicious 
Table 1.  Thematic Analysis of Insider Threats 
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We use the terms accidental, negligent, and malicious as they best describe the behaviour of the 
individual acting as a threat and being consistent with naming used by most of the researchers. We 
introduce the term "mischievous" to describe the active-risk behaviour of the individual performing 
the non-malicious intentional action through the misuse of privileges, and the name describes the act, 
consistent with the nature of the description of the other three types of threats identified here. 
From Table 1, we see that while all researchers identify threats caused by malicious intent, most have 
variations when describing non-malicious threats such as accidental, negligent, and mischievous. Also, 
some researchers have not considered accidental threats to be a threat. While it is possible that some 
of these researchers' focus was exclusively on non-accidental threats, this was not explicitly stated. 
While all researchers address intentional non-malicious insiders, only some have differentiated 
between non-malicious threats resulting from inaction to those resulting from actions through the 
misuse of the privilege of the insider.  
4 Typology of Insiders 
An insider may act in a manner they are not supposed to – either accidentally or deliberately – and the 
threats can be challenging to predict. Understanding the types, motivation, and implications of insider 
threats are essential for an organisation to identify the vulnerabilities, develop prevention strategies, 
and protect their systems from breaches. The mitigation strategy implemented for one type of threat 
may not be suitable for another.  Based on the extensive review of prior research, we classify, define, 
and explain the different types of insiders in this section. 
4.1 Accidental Insider 
Accidental refers to an unexpected act without malicious motive or deliberate intent. We define an 
accidental insider as: 
an insider who has no malicious intent associated with their action or inaction; and due to a 
lapse makes an error that caused harm or increased the probability of future harm to the 
organisation's information systems.  
Accidental incidents may occur when the individual knows the right procedure, but mistakes happen 
when performing familiar tasks or due to the person's ignorance of the system (Ahola, 2019). There are 
many ways in which an insider can accidentally have an impact on security. Examples include: 
 Misdelivery: sending something to a wrong recipient (Verizon, 2018); posting sensitive 
information publicly on a website (CERT, 2018). According to Verizon (2018), misdelivery was 
the fourth most common cause of all cybersecurity incidents. 
 Unintentional disclosure: unwittingly being influenced to divulge confidential or sensitive 
information to an unauthorised person, which subsequently allows the unauthorised person to 
access or breach the protected system (Mouton, Leenen, & Venter, 2016). 
 Errors and omissions: data entry errors when users create or edit data, errors by system 
developers and programmers in the form of bugs (Nieles, Dempsey, & Pillitteri, 2017). 
 Physical loss: misplacement or loss of a portable device (Li, No, & Boritz, 2020). Personal, 
confidential, and sensitive information from the devices can be accessed and used for future 
attacks. 
CERT (2018) explain the reasons for unintentional incidents by insiders as simple human error, 
fatigue or sleepiness, feeling of stress, lack of attention, the effect of drugs, and mood. A study 
conducted in 2018 by Shred-it (sample size unknown) revealed that over 40% of small business 
owners and executives reported employee negligence or accidental loss to be the root cause of their 
data security breach (Shred-it, 2018).  
Unwitting or passive insiders range from individuals who share information unaware of the security 
implications to those who are manipulated and coerced into active participation (NAIC, 2008). 
However, it would not be justified to assume that these human vulnerabilities are the same as 
undesirable behaviour (Sasse et al., 2007). Security behaviours are highly context-bound, and 
behaviour that may be highly desirable in one context may potentially cause a security risk in another 
– for example, trusting or assisting a colleague. In a social context, discussing and sharing information 
with a colleague would be considered to be team-spirited and desirable. In contrast, in a security 
context, it may be considered as information leakage and a security breach. It is natural for an 
individual to trust a colleague, even if it is someone they have not met earlier, simply because they 
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work for the same organisation. Insiders, therefore, often underestimate the likelihood of falling victim 
to a cybersecurity breach, and a dishonest colleague could leverage this trust.  
Another dimension to consider is the frequency of the incidents.  This can give some indication of the 
intent of an insider. The first time an insider performs one or more of these acts, it may be accidental. 
However, when such actions are repeated, the classification might more appropriately be considered 
negligent or mischievous (Giandomenico & Groot, 2018). 
4.2 Negligent Insider 
Negligence refers to the deliberate omission of information security measures. We define a negligent 
insider as: 
an insider who has no malicious intent associated with their intentional inaction; and 
through their passive-risk behaviour has caused harm or increased the probability of future 
harm to the organisation's information systems.  
Despite having security measures such as firewalls, security patches, and virus scanners, the threat to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems still exists through the negligence 
of the information security management teams or their users (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). 
Incidents may be a result of ignoring the security policy as the risk is perceived to be low, having naïve 
and careless attitude, and taking "short cuts" to save time among others (Gyunka & Christiana, 2017; 
Parsons et al., 2015). Users often use rationalisation to justify deviant actions (Barlow, Warkentin, 
Ormond, & Dennis, 2013). For example, an individual may share the network password with 
colleagues because they rationalise that their actions cause no harm.  
Some examples of negligent insider threats to an organisation include: 
 Failure to follow password policies: using default or easy to guess passwords, writing down the 
password, sharing the password with colleagues, or using the same passwords over many 
systems (Verizon, 2018). As per NCSC (UK) (2019), 123456 is the most popular password, and 
45% of people reuse the password of their email account on other services. 
 Failure to update patches: Software developers fix vulnerabilities to software and send updates 
for installation. More often than not, end-users delay installation of updates and with dire 
results (Ahola, 2019). 
 Ignorance: Not having the required level of knowledge or enough information about a specific 
circumstance (Ahola, 2019) may result in making an incorrect entry or giving out the wrong 
information. Using unsecured Wi-Fi networks without understanding the risks can result in 
personal information and credentials being harvested (Ahola, 2019). 
Negligent acts have no malicious intent or misuse of privileges but cause harm to the organisation due 
to inaction such as failing to update the password, leaving systems unattended, or failing to install 
security patches.  The motivation of negligent acts may be due to convenience, high workload, policy 
complexity, or habitual bypassing of security mechanisms (Sasse et al., 2007). Negligence can also be 
from the management failing to upgrade the systems or software. Canner (2020) informs that only 
around 50% of the surveyed IT specialists used software to combat phishing attacks, and less than 50% 
used email encryption or provided secure collaboration tools. Even with the knowledge of the threats 
and risks, people do not use these technologies.  Often non-malicious violations are not officially 
reported due to their unidentifiable nature or due to the violations seemingly so minor (AlHogail, 
2015). 
4.3 Mischievous Insider 
We introduce the term mischievous to describe an intentional misuse of privileges without malicious 
intent. We define a mischievous insider as: 
an insider who has no malicious intent associated with their intentional action; and through 
their active-risk behaviour has misused their privileges and has caused harm or increased 
the probability of future harm to the organisation's information systems.  
A mischievous insider is often aware of the security risks and knows the right course of action, but still 
chooses to violate policies as a shortcut or because they simply do not think that the rules are crucial 
(Ahola, 2019; Wall, 2013). Guo et al. (2011) conceptualise intentional non-malicious security violations 
to have all of the following four characteristics (1) intentional behaviour: non-malicious security 
violation with a conscious decision to follow a course of action, (2) self-benefiting without malicious 
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intent: such as to save time and effort, (3) voluntary rule-breaking: choosing to violate security policies 
at their own will, and (4) possibly causing danger or security risk. These characteristics apply to a 
mischievous insider. Examples of mischievous behaviour include: 
 Accessing unauthorised confidential files for fun or out of curiosity without an intention to 
cause harm (Hunker & Probst, 2011);  
 Downloading unauthorised files or software applications to finish a job quicker (Guo et al., 
2011), installing unauthorised external applications on work devices to improve efficiency 
(Willison & Warkentin, 2013); 
 Violating network usage policy (Stanton et al., 2005), using unauthorised removable media, 
allocating excessive privileges to users, disabling security configurations (Guo et al., 2011);  
 Sharing the password with a colleague who has forgotten theirs may result in an unanticipated 
incident negatively effecting the organisation's information security (Willison & Warkentin, 
2013). 
Lacombe (2017) refers to a study from CompTIA and reports that human errors account for 52% of the 
root causes of security breaches. 42% of these cited end-user failures to follow procedures; 42% cited 
general carelessness; 31% cited the inability to get up to speed on new threats; 29% cited lack of 
expertise with applications; 26% cited IT staff failure to follow policies and procedure. Mischievous 
acts are caused by the intentional misuse of privileges without an intention to cause harm, such as 
using their privileges to access confidential information of a celebrity client out of curiosity. While 
viewing personal details may seem harmless, and a victimless crime, the client's privacy has been 
compromised.  
Much of prior work does not differentiate a negligent insider from a mischievous insider. Instead, 
these are grouped as intentional non-malicious (Dupuis & Khadeer, 2016), non-malicious deviant (Van 
Den Bergh & Njenga, 2016), or volitional non-malicious non-compliance (Willison & Warkentin, 
2013). While both types do not intend to cause harm and are aware of the associated risks, they are 
differentiated in terms of any misuse of their privileges. A negligent insider does not misuse their 
privileges but rather fail to comply with the security procedure, whereas a mischievous insider 
deliberately misuses their privileges. The action and behaviour behind negligent acts and mischievous 
acts are different. We, therefore, conceptualise these in a new way as separate classes of insider threats 
based on behaviour.  
4.4 Malicious Insider 
The definition of a malicious insider and their intentional action to breach security was consistent 
among prior researchers. We define a malicious insider as: 
an insider who has a malicious intent associated with their action or inaction; and has 
caused harm or increased the probability of future harm to the organisation's information 
systems. 
A malicious insider is an insider who makes a conscious choice to misbehave and cause harm to the 
organisation (Gyunka & Christiana, 2017; Parsons et al., 2015; Wall, 2013). Some examples of 
malicious insider threats include: 
 Insider social engineering: an insider manipulating a colleague to forcefully, intentionally, or 
unintentionally release sensitive information (Elmrabit et al., 2015). 
 Insider fraud: an insider obtaining and retaining information such as credit card details for 
fraud and identity theft; Modifying information without authorisation with the intent to self-
benefit (CERT, 2018; Nieles et al., 2017). 
 Insider IP theft: an insider theft of trade secrets, modifying or stealing confidential or sensitive 
information; includes industrial espionage and colluding with outsiders (CERT, 2018) 
 IT sabotage: an insider's use of their IT experience and knowledge to cause specific harm to an 
individual or organisation. (Elmrabit et al., 2015) 
 Exploit security gaps: An insiders curiosity to discover vulnerabilities in existing or new 
technologies to launch attacks in future (Gupta, Arachchilage, & Psannis, 2018) 
The motivation for an attacker to commit malicious acts could be for self-benefit or personal gains, 
sense of entitlement, disgruntlement, revenge (Hadlington, 2018) 
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4.5 Summary of Insider threats 
An accidental insider has no intent to violate security policies nor a motive to do so.  Often, they are 
fully skilled to do their jobs, and any incident may be a one-off and caused by a lapse in judgement. 
While both negligent and mischievous insiders are intentionally non-compliant, these intentions are 
not malicious in nature and they are differentiated in terms of any misuse of their privileges. Neither 
accidental nor negligent insiders deliberately misuse their privileges, whereas a mischievous or 
malicious insider may deliberately and skilfully misuse their privileges. Furthermore, a negligent 
insider knows that they are violating the security policies but either underestimate the risks or lack the 
motivation to comply. In contrast, a mischievous insider is aware of the risks and knowingly decides to 
break the rules without malice, while a malicious insider does so to self-benefit or to cause harm. 
Through our profiling of accidental insider, negligent insider, mischievous insider, and malicious 
insider, we found that there was a crossover in the intent, motives, and actions between them.  This 
crossover of characteristics blurs the distinction between conventional accidental, negligent, 
mischievous, and malicious acts. We attribute this overlap to the fact that intent is granular and a 
gradient rather than distinct. The threats caused by accident or oversight by careless or unmotivated 
employees can be the precursor to more extreme incidents (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Accidental 
acts can soon turn to negligent acts then to mischievous acts and ultimately to malicious acts. 
Figure 1 illustrates the differentiating characteristics of the types of insiders. Note that the types are 
conceptualised as a continuum rather than being distinct.  
 
Figure 1: Summary of Types of Insiders 
The motivation that differentiates a malicious insider from a non-malicious insider may not always be 
evident, and it may not be possible to differentiate these groups based on their actions. A survey 
conducted by Dupuis and Khadeer (2016) confirmed that the characteristics of a malicious and a non-
malicious insider were similar. It is therefore hard in practice to make a clear distinction between the 
execution of malicious acts from naïve or accidental acts (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Hence, depicting 
each insider type as mutually exclusive may be simplistic or unrealistic.  
5 Discussion 
Organisations need to be able to differentiate the different types of threats to develop appropriate 
mitigation and limit the impacts on their cybersecurity.  While a technical security vulnerability can be 
well-defined, the nature of insider threats may not be well understood. To address this issue, we 
present a classification of insider threats, including accidental, negligent, mischievous, and malicious 
insiders. The characteristics of an insider threat are differentiated based on an individual's intent, 
motive, and actions to inform organisations on the types of threat. Understanding the characteristics 
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of the different threat types can help organisations to identify potential threats and enhance their 
cybersecurity strategies. 
This classification is key to improve the effectiveness of detection and prevention strategies. 
Organisations need to understand that it may no longer be sufficient to have one standard approach to 
address threats to cybersecurity. It is important to address each type of threat, identify suitable 
preventative strategies, and apply the right type of corrective actions towards accidental, negligent, 
mischievous, and malicious insiders. The proposed insider threat classification extends prior work by 
integrating the different classes of insider to present a consistent terminology and definition of insider 
threat types.  Having a common vocabulary facilitates a unified view of insider threats and aids with 
the progression of future research in this direction.  
The profiles of an accidental, negligent, mischievous, and a malicious insider, show a crossover in the 
intent, behaviour, and actions between the different types.  This nexus suggests that individuals 
engaging in behaviour without any malicious intent could transition to engaging in behaviour to cause 
harm to the organisation. Therefore, in our insider threat classification model, we describe intent as a 
continuum of accidental, negligent, mischievous, and malicious nature.  Figure 2 illustrates where this 
insider threat classification would fit in a broader security threat model. The classification of external 
threat sources, non-human internal threat agents, and the impacts of the threats are not in the scope of 
the current study and are promising candidates for further research. 
 
Figure 2: Insider Threat Classification (adapted from Willison and Warkentin (2013)) 
Our proposed classification extends Willison and Warkentin's (2013) model, which shows intent as a 
continuum of passive non-volitional non-compliance to volitional non-malicious non-compliance to 
intentional malicious computer abuse. We show intent as a continuum of accidental to negligent to 
mischievous and ultimately to an intentional act of cybercrime by an insider. The nature of the intent 
conceptualised as a continuum, as opposed to distinct, justifies the inconsistencies in prior literature 
on the classification of non-malicious threats.  
A further implication of this model is to illustrate that individuals may transition from one insider type 
to another. An insider's accidental system misuse can become an opportunity for a future malicious act 
to breach the system or harm the organisation. This is of relevance to organisational stakeholders, as 
the transition may be identified only through keen observation. For example, an individual may 
accidentally discover a system loophole and may abuse the loophole with a perception that there is no 
negative consequence to their action. Eventually, they may be motivated to deliberately act either to 
self-benefit or to sabotage the organisation's information systems.  
While an individual's intent of a breach may not be apparent when the breach is detected, the 
frequency of the breach and the insider's knowledge of the vulnerability can help determine the intent 
of the breach. If vulnerability to the system has been detected, the sequence of actions taken by the 
individual provides crucial insights into their intent. When a vulnerability is detected, the user must 
report it to the authority.  If this vulnerability was discovered or exploited by accident, the report 
should still be made so that user training can be provided to overcome future incidents. However, if an 
individual is found to have repeatedly exploited the vulnerability without reporting it, it may be 
considered a deliberate malicious act and appropriate actions need to be taken by the organisation. 
Organisations will need to analyse these scenarios and implement the right policies and prevention 
strategies to protect their information systems. 
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6 Conclusion 
Threat classification is essential for organisations to implement appropriate and effective cybersecurity 
strategies. In this paper, we have presented a unified typology and classification of insider threats 
building on prior research in this domain. The thematic analysis enabled us to first identify the 
problem areas in the information systems literature. We observed inconsistency in the insider type 
classification as it was based on different factors, and different terminology and definitions were 
applied for insider types. We extended prior work by providing a standard classification method, 
consistent terminology, and definition for insider types.  
The proposed insider classification is based on an individual's intent, motive, and actions, and 
described as accidental, negligent, mischievous, and malicious. This classification can provide the 
organisation with an insight into the most relevant threats and areas that are vulnerable to these 
threats. We introduce the term mischievous insider to describe an intentional non-malicious misuse of 
privileges. We also give new definitions for each type of insider threat which will provide organisations 
with an insider type profile. Having a common vocabulary and a unified understanding of the threats 
will be useful for future research and will help to advance the field. 
We contribute new knowledge to the field of cybersecurity with the classification of the four types of 
insiders. The knowledge of the distinction yet similarity between each of the types will allow 
organisations to have an increased awareness that individuals can move across four types over time. 
We also make an incremental contribution to the existing security threat model by outlining intent as a 
continuum of the four types of insiders – because the nature of the intent is granular as opposed to 
distinct. This justifies the inconsistencies in the literature on the classification of non-malicious 
threats. These contributions are summarised above in Figures 1 and 2.  
Our classification of insider threats will be a necessary component of a comprehensive framework for 
best practices in cybersecurity. This study provides the foundations for future work to investigate 
prevention strategies and corrective actions to manage the impact of changing roles of an insider 
within a continuum model. Additional research will help us better ascertain the motivation, mode, and 
impact of the different insider type behaviours. 
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